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Cultural change and social transformation are essential elements of the 
process of development. They complement and sustain economic growth.  Economic 
historians acknowledge that the rise of the West from poverty to wealth was as much 
the result of improvements in trade, savings, investment and productivity as of 
emerging norms of thrift, trust, specialisation, rationality and contractual relations 
[Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986)]. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
economic development is essentially a phenomenon of cultural change. 
The recognition of the role of cultural and social factors in economic growth 
has led to a subtle revision of the terminology from ‘economic development’ to the 
adjectiveless term ‘development’ or the fully spelled out title of economic and social 
development. Yet this acknowledgement has remained largely on the conceptual 
plane. It has not been translated into policies and programmes to deliberately set the 
direction of cultural change and define the alignment of social organisation. 
Development strategies have, by and large, treated social and cultural factors as 
exogenous variables. This is true of development planning in general and in 
particular of its practice in Pakistan. In fifty years of economic planning in Pakistan, 
little attention has been paid to the social and cultural aspects of development. 
This paper argues that the neglect of social and cultural factors has created an 
institutional lag between spatial, economic and technological sectors on the one hand 
and the cultural, social and political institutions, on the other. Pakistan is 
predominantly an urbanised society spatially and demographically, but its social 
institutions and cultural ethos remain rooted in traditions of rural origins.1 This 
 
Mohammad A. Qadeer is Professor, Urban and Regional Planning, Queen’s University, Canada. 
1Pakistan’s social institutions and political behaviours are often described to be ‘feudal’ in norms 
and structures. This appellation is an indicator of the acknowledgement of rural influences. 
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divergence between economic and spatial organisations and social and cultural 
institutions has impeded the process of sustained development. This is the 
proposition argued in this paper. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BASES OF DEVELOPMENT 
The political economy of development is a theoretical tradition that has long 
emphasised the role of social structure and cultural norms in economic production and 
distribution. Classical economists, Smith, Malthus, Mills and Marx analysed economic 
systems in terms of social and political institutions. In contemporary theories, the 
Modernisation paradigm explicitly links economic growth with cultural change, 
political development and behavioural transformations. A classical formulation of the 
Modernisation paradigm was used by Gunnar Myrdal in his monumental study, Asian 
Drama to analyse the prospects of economic development in South Asia, including 
Pakistan [Myrdal (1968)]. Drawing on South Asian statements of development goals 
and approaches, Myrdal articulated a set of Modernisation ideals as the criteria for 
policy analysis. Among those ideals were (a) rationality, (b) the improvement of the 
host of undesirable conditions, (c) rise of productivity, (d) rise of level of living, (e) 
social and economic equalisation, (f) improved institutions and attitudes such as 
efficiency, diligence, orderliness, punctuality, honesty, enterprise, integrity and self-
reliance, etc., (g) national consolidations, (h) national independence, (i) political 
democracy, (j) democracy at grassroots, (k) social discipline versus democratic 
planning [Myrdal (1968), pp. 57–67].  
This list of the guiding principles includes not only economic criteria such as 
the rise of productivity and equitable distribution, but also the political, cultural and 
social conditions without which  development is presumed to be unrealisable on a 
sustained basis. There are disagreements about the significance of particular items on 
Myrdal’s list, but his arguments and approach have not been disputed, namely, the 
stress on political, cultural and social reforms along with economic and technological 
progress. His definition of development as “upward movement of the whole system” 
exemplifies this conception [Myrdal (1968), p. 1868]. 
On application, the Modernisation paradigm turned out to be an unabashed form 
of Westernisation. It envisaged transposing Western values, roles and institutions to the 
Third World [McClelland (1961) and Apter (1965)]. The reaction to the Modernisation 
paradigm was largely conditioned by its agenda of Westernisation. Yet its message that  
institutional change is necessary for economic development keeps on resurfacing both 
in theories and practice of development planning. 
The dependency theories, the notions of ‘New Economic Order’ and the 
‘World System’, though insistently critical of the Modernisation theories, laid stress 
on political systems and international relations as the fountainheads of 
underdevelopment. The political and social variables, rather than purely economic 
factors, remained centrepieces of the development strategies in these theoretical 
formulations. 
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The combination of World Bank’s clout as the prime financier of development 
with its proclaimed interest in guiding development policies have given it a 
preponderant position in the development discourse. The World Bank’s policy 
agenda has become the source of development models and its programmes have 
swept through the world, in wave after wave, to implement successive formulations. 
Its conceptions of development strategies swung from the capital-output ratio based 
models to the import substitution strategies and subsequently the human resource 
development approach over a span of about a decade (mid 1960s to mid 1970s). The 
protest movements of late 1960s in many countries of the world pointed out the 
neglect of ‘equity’ in the international development approaches. McNamara’s Mia 
Culpa for the World Bank and a new focus of its programmes on basic needs and the 
poverty alleviation underlined the human dimensions of economic development. The 
subsequent rise of the Human Development Approach is a logical consequence of 
the realisation that  economic growth cannot be separated from distributional justice 
and enhancement of human welfare. Altogether the economic development strategies 
have cyclically emphasised and ignored political and social factors. Yet every phase 
of preoccupation with purely economic factors has brought home the realisation that 
social institutions are the foundations of economic organisation. This institutionalist 
view is reflected in successive decades such as in the works of Adelman and Morris 
(1967); Chenery (1974) and Olson (1983). 
The neo-liberal ideology of 1980s may be reducing  public role in 
development but paradoxically it is also pushing forward the agenda of institutional 
reforms to introduce democratic practices, decentralise governments, increase the 
role of women, improve sustainable management of environment and 
denationalisation of production and finance, etc. This is the new agenda of 
development. It has been termed as the “neo-institutional approach”. From Putnam’s 
social capital to North’s transaction costs and Sen’s entitlements are ideas that bring 
political, social and cultural factors to the core of the development strategies [Putnam 
(1993); North (1989) and Sen (1981)]. One could say that the institutional reform 
agenda resurrects the Modernisation paradigm, especially for those political and 
social institutions that underlie economic transactions, i.e., democratic governance, 
property rights, contract law, fiscal and financial discipline, privatisation and 
decentralisation of governmental operations, etc. These institutions are assumed to 
be universal in scope and not merely Western artifacts. 
 
THE PHENOMENON OF INSTITUTIONAL LAG 
Despite the focus on (some) institutions as objects of reform for economic 
development, the institutional approach does not aim at, for example, realignment of 
family and marriage, work, labour, community, ethnicity and organisational culture. 
Yet these social institutions and cultural norms define the structure of property, 
contracts, taxes, local government and other institutions undergoing market 
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transactions. The neo-institutional reforms are focussing almost exclusively on 
transactional institutions. They are not likely to bring about necessary efficiency and 
equality without some deliberate efforts to realign the social and cultural systems. 
The neglect of social and cultural development precipitates the phenomenon of 
institutional lag whereby material, physical or technological elements of institutions 
change, while political, social and cultural elements remain unaffected, resulting in 
different institutions or various segments of the same institutions out of balance with 
each other. The phenomenon of institutional lag in cultural systems was identified in 
the hypothesis of cultural lag long ago by Ogburn [Ogburn (1922)]. 
Institutional lag is impeding economic growth. Economic development 
requires parallel changes in economic, political, social and cultural institutions, both 
at the macro and micro levels. The reform agenda should extend to social and 
cultural systems as well as the political and economic organisations. Without the 
former, the latter will be another failed initiative. This proposition will be examined 
through the case study of urbanisation in Pakistan. 
 
TWO PROCESSES OF URBANISATION IN PAKISTAN 
By census definition, about one-third (32.5 percent in 1998) of Pakistan’s 
population lives in metropolitan or municipal corporations, municipal or town 
committees or cantonments, namely in urban places. The urban population is 
increasing at the rate of 3.45 percent per year compared to 2.24 percent of the rural 
population. No matter what measure is used, cross-sectional or longitudinal, the 
proportion of Pakistan’s population living in urban areas is exploding, to use a 
popular metaphor, so are the number and areas of the designated urban places. This 
is the description of conventional urban growth resulting from the population 
increase in cities and towns. Its structure and consequences are well known. 
The second process of urbanisation is unrecognised and is working its way 
largely unnoticed. Yet it is building up the momentum of social change that equals, 
perhaps exceeds, the much discussed urban crisis. This is  urbanisation through the 
densification of rural areas under the population pressure. Villages burst out to 
scatter homesteads and hamlets across the landscape, conversely homesteads 
coalesce together to form bands of linear settlements. One way or the other extensive 
countryside turns into a continuous series of settlements, interspersed with towns and 
cities. This is the settlement system emerging in rural regions of urban level 
densities, i.e., 400 persons per sq. km. This density criteria is an almost universal 
measure to define urban areas, particularly in the newly urbanising regions. It is 
assumed that at this density the spatial organisation and residential land economy of 
an area assumes urban characteristics. Rural regions which have reached or 
surpassed this level of density have been called Ruralopolises [Qadeer (2000)]. They 
are a distinct form of settlement system, urban in spatial organisation and land 
economy, but agrarian in economic organisation. 
Urbanisation and Social Transformation 
 
1197
The urban level density in a rural setting is the defining characteristics of 
ruralopolitan areas. The high density is a transformative force. It changes the spatial 
organisation, the settlement pattern, the form and structure of villages and the land 
economy, including the provision of house lots.  
High density has three distinct levels of impact: (i) its primary impact is on 
the provision of residential land, though the competition for agricultural land is also 
strong. The land for living begins to turn from a family entitlement to an individual 
property, from a relatively accessible to scarce goods. High density fills up village 
sites, catalyses the formation of satellite settlements and pockmarks the landscape 
with homesteads, hamlets, roadside stalls, changing the settlement pattern and 
creating a diffused band of human settlement that stretches along highways and 
roads. (ii) The secondary effect of high density affect the provision of community 
facilities and services, e.g. water supply, drains, streets and paths, etc. They evolve 
from incrementally and privately provided goods to collective goods meant to be 
provided on the community-wide basis. These facilities and services require 10–50 
percent additional land per housing unit for external facilities and services. Also they 
necessitate formal organisational and management structures for their provision. 
Some form of local administration, community based or publicly mandated, become 
a necessity. Overall, these impacts require transformation of community 
management from informal practices to formal institutions. On all these scores, the 
density precipitates functional needs which may or may not be fulfilled. (iii) The 
tertiary impact of high density appears in the form of changing economic and 
functional bases of all levels of settlement hierarchy. The high density precipitates 
thresholds for schools, dispensaries, stores, play fields, land use and environmental 
regulations, public health and safety measures, for example. These activities and 
functions become necessary and wherever they materialise, they change the character 
of the corresponding settlements. Villages become towns and towns turn into 
veritable cities. All in all, these system-wide impacts lay ground for the emergence 
of wide range of non-agricultural activities, collective goods and organisational and 
political changes in rural regions. 
Altogether the three levels of the density’s impact realign the spatial 
organisation, settlement pattern and residential land economy towards urban forms. 
These are processes of urban transformation. The spatial and technical changes occur 
and the needs for organisational and institutional transformation are precipitated. 
Whether those needs are fulfilled depends on the parallel development of social, 
political and cultural institutions. The process of spatial and institutional change set 
in motion by  high density is the manifestation of  urbanisation through implosion. 
The settlement system emerging from this process is Ruralopolis. 
 
RURALOPOLISES IN PAKISTAN 
Map1 shows two clusters of contiguous districts in Pakistan whose rural 
population  densities  are  400  persons  or  more  per  sq. km. These are Pakistan’s  
 PAKISTAN 
Ruralopolises: 
High Density Rural Districts 
1998 
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ruralopolises. The larger one is in Punjab spread across the eastern half of the 
province—from Sialkot to Multan, an area 55,738 sq. km.  It is a densely settled 
region dotted with cities, towns and sprawled villages and hamlets. In this region, 
one can travel along any road and never be out of sight of a house, village or 
workshop. Towns and cities may be distant but the human settlement is always 
nearby. From Gujrat to Lahore and then onward to Multan, one is always in urban 
presence. Spatially this area is one extended urbanising region, one ruralopolis. The 
second ruralopolis is centred around Peshawar and extends across Peshawar Valley 
and beyond into the lower reaches of Swat Valley. Karachi to Hydrabad is already a 
corridor of urban settlements. 
The rural population of these two ruralopolises was about 31.3 million in 1998. 
Adding this to the urban population of Pakistan (42.5 million), means that about 56.5 
percent of Pakistan’s population is urbanised by one or the other process of urbanisation. 
 
RURAL-URBAN CONTINUUM AND URBANISATION 
OF EVERYBODY 
While urbanisation, not just city living, has enveloped a majority of Pakistan’s 
population, a sizeable minority making the rural parts of arid western Punjab, Upper 
Sind, Balochistan and southern NWFP are also touched by urban ways of life at least 
materially. While urbanisation is largely a spatial phenomenon, urbanism as a 
(urban) way of life is diffusing all across the land. 
Pakistan’s rural and urban communities are two sides of the national culture, 
recapitulating in varying intensities its societal institutions. The cash economy, the 
centralised state and the transportation and communication technologies have 
bridged rural and urban differences. The cities are being ruralised with the migration 
from villages, and conversely villages are being infiltrated by motor bicycles, videos, 
tea shops, snooker clubs, telephones and workshops, namely the cultural artifacts 
normally associated with urban living. The rural in Pakistan is increasingly 
synonymous with an occupational specialisation namely agriculture, and its related 
industries. The purely rural social patterns and cultural practices are largely the sub-
culture of agricultural classes. Thus the rural and urban differences are essentially 
specific sectoral and class configurations of social institutions and cultural patterns. 
The sum total of this argument is that the purely rural population is a minority in 
Pakistan and even it is coming under urban influences. The majority of Pakistan is 
urbanised spatially and technologically. Altogether Pakistan can be aptly described 
in Abu-Lughod’s phrase “Urbanisation of Everybody” [Abu-Lughod (1991)]. 
 
IMPERATIVES OF URBANISATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Urbanisation is primarily a process of spatial restructuring. It concentrates 
people and their activities in a limited space. This concentration (density effect) 
increases social interaction, interlinks economic activities, and precipitates 
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interdependencies and external economies and diseconomies. These processes in turn 
affect locational parameters and necessitate a whole new range of facilities, services, 
laws, customs and practices. The dense web of human interactions requires 
transformation of social relations, economic organisation, and even moral order. It 
requires collectivisation of many goods and services that in sparsely settled non-
urban settings are either not needed or privately provided. It redefines the bases of 
land tenures and property rights. On all these scores, urbanisation is simultaneously 
an expression and a catalyst for social and economic changes. The efficiency and 
welfare of urban communities depend on such social changes and restructuring of 
institutions. These are the imperatives of urbanisation. 
There are urban areas where imperatives of urbanisation are not fulfilled for a 
long period. Western cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Dickens’ 
London, were in such a state. The current urban crisis in the Third World is more a 
symptom of the institutional lag than of the resource limitation. In the same vein, as 
Pakistan urbanises, it needs to deliberately promote the development of institutions 
and organisations appropriate for urban ways of life. What are these institutional 
imperatives and how is the Pakistani society lagging in their development are 
analysed in the following sections. 
 
Reforming Urban Land System 
Undoubtedly the physical base of land, namely the earth’s surface, remains 
unchanged but the attributes required for urban uses differ considerably from those 
valued in rural economies, e.g. location, accessibility to linked activities, community 
facilities and services and the property rights [Qadeer (1981)]. Almost all these 
attributes arise from interlocking externalities of the area-wide and neighbourhood 
activities. They arise from ‘outside’ a site and are not part of its natural endowment. 
The use and value of a piece of urban land depend on its relative location in relation to 
sites where complementary activities are being carried out. Its use and value also 
depend on the provision of roads, drains, schools, electricity, waste disposal, safety and 
amenity, etc., in sum the umbrella of collective goods, services and organisations 
surrounding a site. Thus a private use of an urban site is not viable without 
complementary uses of public lands in infrastructure and overhead services. In Western 
cities, almost as much land is needed outside a house to service it as is within the 
boundaries of its site [Darin-Drabkin (1977)]. My study of the ruralopolitan areas 
suggests that 10–50 percent of additional land is needed in public uses for every unit of 
residential land, the ratio depending on the size of settlement [Qadeer (2000)]. 
This description of the nature of urban land is meant to point out that  
urbanisation transforms the basis of land’s utility and value and consequently the 
scope of its ownership. An owner of urban land is, for example, not free to build a 
slaughter house or a fireworks factory in the middle of a residential neighbourhood, 
because his/her actions can imperil the safety or health of his neighbours. Similarly a 
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private piece of land is worthless if it is not linked to streets, drains, water supply or 
police protection, namely collective goods of some kind.  Thus  private property in 
urban land is framed by public investment, regulations and neighbouring activities.  
The urban land reforms require formalisation and restructuring of the bundle 
of rights constituting private property and complementary public interests in the use, 
value and disposition of land. The urban land system also includes surveying and 
registration procedures, zoning and building regulations and property taxation. All in 
all, the urban land system is more deeply steeped in externalities (of other’s 
activities), collective goods and public powers. Pakistan’s ‘Patwar’ system of land 
management and the agrarian notions of ownership and tenancy have little relevance 
in urban settings. 
Urbanisation necessitates the restructuring of land system. Western societies 
underwent such institutional changes in a deliberate but evolutionary manner. In 
England, for example, the abolition of feudal tenancies (1882) were followed by 
eight land acts in 1925, to enact modern urban land tenures, complemented by town 
planning acts and public health legislation. 
The urbanisation of Pakistan has precipitated the imperative of institutional 
change in the land sector. Yet even the rural land reforms, largely redistribution of 
ownership rights, have not been vigorously implemented. The notion of restructuring 
urban land system is not even on the policy agenda. The symptoms of the 
institutional lag in land systems are all around, namely wasteful and conflicting 
patterns of land use, the prevalence of encroachment and squatters, the uncertainties 
of land titles and transfers, the operations of Qabza groups and the politics of plots. 
 
The Collectivisation of Private Needs and 
   Systematisation of Public Goods 
Urbanisation builds up a web of interdependencies. For example, effluents and 
garbage dumped outside one’s house spread filth on the neighbour’s doorsteps and 
vice versa, a situation common in Pakistan’s cities. At the doorsteps of houses worth 
crores of rupees are piles of rotting garbage, contrasting private splendour with civic 
squalor. Obviously the livability of a home is indivisible from the garbage disposal 
of others in the neighbourhood and vice versa. These interdependencies, arising 
partially from the density of houses and work places, necessitate the provision of 
collective goods. 
Facilities and services which are largely private goods in low-density rural 
settings turn into collective needs as the density increases. The latrine is a case in 
point. In sparsely settled rural areas, ‘going out in the fields’ is a common practice, 
but it is increasingly not feasible as the seclusion of fields fades away with the 
increasing concentration of people. In dense settlements, the ‘hole in the ground’ 
inside a house becomes a private latrine. Yet as the density further increases, the 
holding tanks and periodic pumping out of the effluents become a necessity. At 
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about 100–150 houses per sq. km., septic tanks cease to be effective. At this density, 
private latrines have to be connected to sewers and drains. Thus with increasing 
density a latrine evolves from a purely private to a semi-collective facility requiring 
collective infrastructure for the disposal of effluents. A similar sequence can be 
traced for paths, streets, water supply, open spaces, and even soft services such as 
numbering of houses and naming of streets, police protection, law and order or 
public welfare for the aged, the widows and orphans of a community. The 
crystallisation of private facilities into collective goods, regardless of their 
availability or not, is the result of urbanisation. 
The provision of collective goods, public or private, involves both 
technological and organisational resources. For example, not only are sewers and 
drains to be designed and built but also systematic procedures for recovering costs, 
managing use and maintaining the network have to be instituted. Whether it is 
community water supply, waste disposal, fire protection or traffic control, making 
provisions for urban facilities and services require cultural and organisational 
change. The traditional and personalised ways of making decisions are not suitable to 
produce and manage collective goods. 
Urbanisation institutes a new form of community life, dependent on collective 
goods, shared interests and formal organisations. An urban community remains 
unfulfilled and dysfunctional without appropriate organisational and cultural changes 
for the provision of collective good. 
 
Institutionalisation of Responsive Local Governance 
The complex networks of interrelations and transactions arising from the 
concentration of people and activities cannot be sustained with informal and 
customary modes of local governance, characteristics of rural communities. 
Urbanisation precipitates a need for formal, representative and impersonal governing 
institutions. As urbanisation spreads, the requisite of the rule-based and responsive 
local government becomes all the more urgent. 
The range and complexity of functions required of local government increase 
in parallel with the intensity of urbanisation. Such functions include coordination of 
specialised operations, production and management of collective goods, taxation and 
financing of facilities and services, and institutionalising people’s participation in 
decision-making. 
The Western experience bears out the proposition that urbanisation 
necessitates responsive local governance. As Britain, USA and Canada, for example, 
were urbanised by the late 19th and early 20th century, faced with expanding and 
complex public responsibilities, they had to institute modern and representative local 
governments. The Dickensenian living conditions, the periodic epidemics, industrial 
pollution and exploited labour and festering slums were the alarm bells of the 
institutional break down. All three countries, and other European states, enacted 
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series of legislation, complemented by numerous social movements to usher an era 
of urban reforms in early 1900s. The YMCA, Salvation Army, and Women’s 
Institutes are examples of social reform movements to promote social change. The 
merchants and industrialists joined hands with social reformers to press for citizens’ 
participation, town planning and public health and professionalisation of municipal 
services. The urbanisation crystallised the needs for urban reforms and the states 
fulfilled these demands. 
For the Third World, the imperative of responsive local government has been 
lately acknowledged by the World Bank and other international agencies. The 
development of local government, institutions and devolution of the relevant 
functions and authority to local levels is a part of the policy agenda and loan 
conditionalities of the World Bank. 
The urbanisation of Pakistan has not yet led to the development of effective 
and modern local governance institutions. Local governments have remained a 
preserve of Baradaris and clan, on the one hand, and subordinated to provincial 
bureaucracies and district administration, on the other. They are both ineffective and 
corrupt. There has been no attempt to organise them in a modern idiom. 
Urban governance requires institutionalisation of interest communities and 
impersonal decision-making processes. The lag in the development of such 
institutions is probably the most significant impediment in the progress of urbanised 
Pakistan. 
 
Restructuring Local Economies 
The push towards urbanisation may come from the population pressure, as is 
the case in Pakistan, but it turns into a force of economic transformation, particularly 
at the local and regional levels. A sectoral shift in economic production from primary 
to secondary, tertiary and even quaternary sectors parallels the spread and 
intensification of urbanisation. The local economic base is broadened with increasing 
specialisation of activities, division of labour and forward-backward linkages among 
the production activities. 
An urban area is also the site of consumption for higher order goods and 
services, namely surgeries, specialist’s medical care, courts, fashionable clothes and 
jewelry, movies, theater and sports, etc. Altogether urbanisation propels local 
economies towards specialised lines of production and consumption. Yet this 
transformation of local economies is not a predestined process. It is nourished and 
sustained by corresponding restructuring of local economic organisations and public 
institutions. Without the latter developments, the former process remains in 
suspension. 
An urban economy emerges from the interlinkages among specialised 
activities and gains in efficiency through common infrastructure and services. It 
benefits from ‘economies of scale and agglomeration and from the proximity of 
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labour, capital, and technology’ [World Bank (1991), p. 34]. Such spatial economies 
can only be taken advantage of if infrastructure of both hard and soft services is 
developed, i.e. roads, land use, control, traffic management, telephones, equitable 
taxation, efficient banking facilities, market regulations, as well as trust, objective 
information and dealings by rules. Without such infrastructure and institutions, the 
productivity of firms declines (Ibid: 37). 
Pakistan is severely lacking in these facilities and services all across the country, 
but their inadequacy is striking in cities. The power and water shortages, traffic grid 
locks, telephone breakdowns, housing shortages, and crime are symptoms of 
infrastructural deficiencies. Equally detrimental for local economic growth are highly 
structured and almost ‘sanctioned’ practices of kickbacks, political and administrative 
corruption, clannish organisations and personalised modes of transaction, poor skills 
and wasteful procedures, etc.  All in all, the social and cultural institutions undergriding 
the economic organisation and transactional practices have to be restructured to 
promote norms of impersonal dealings, i.e., trust (in) and reliability, rationality and 
punctuality and efficiency and accountability. These norms were recognised by 
Myrdal. The urban experience necessitates the institutional reorganisation in the social 
and cultural substratum of local economic organisations. The World Bank has 
recognised the need for institutional reforms primarily in market promoting structures. 
Yet the institutional lag extends to the socio-cultural underpinnings of the transactional 
institutions. Restructuring the institutional bases of economic organisations is as 
important as the agenda of structural reforms. 
 
Reforming Social Institutions and Cultural Practices 
Urbanisation has long been recognised as a catalyst for changes in social 
structure, cultural norms and human behaviours. Its concentrated population and 
commercial-industrial mode of production necessitate vast changes in social relations 
and people’s interactions. No longer can the intimacy and emotional intensity of 
face-to-face relations be extended to everybody one comes across in a day’s work. 
Much of daily dealings are with people not related by kinship or friendship. They 
have to be segmental and secondary in sentiments. Similarly, bonds of locality 
weaken and the basis of community life shifts as people’s occupations take them 
away to other places. The caste and clan ties are overlaid with class and occupational 
interests. The beliefs, occupations and experiences of one generation are of little 
value for the next confronting new situations. All in all, urbanisation lays the bases 
for the realignment of social organisation and the redefinition of social relations as 
well as cultural norms. Urban living requires punctuality, objectivity and 
impersonalisation (of dealings) for its efficient functioning. Without, such 
behavioural changes, the orderliness and efficiency cannot be maintained in daily 
routines of large concentrations of population. The village norms and patterns of 
behaviour are not functional and efficient in urban settings. 
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The social transformation that comes with the emergence of cities was noted 
by Ibn Khaldun (1967) in the 14th century. He equated civilisation with cities and 
contrasted it with the Bedouin way of life. The sociological theory has a long 
tradition of differentiating between rural and urban social organisations. Weber 
(1905); Tonnies (1887) and Simmel (1905) developed models of rural-urban 
differences, and their formulations culminated in the seminal theory of Wirth about 
“urbanism as a way of live” (1938). He contended that the size, density and 
heterogeneity of urban population lead to impersonalisation of relations (and 
dealings), specialisation of activities and secularisation of life [Wirth (1938)]. The 
Western experiences of urbanisation affirmed these theories, leading to their 
generalisation into deterministic explanations. Modernisation theorists incorporated 
the deterministic perspectives of urbanism and maintained that the envisaged social 
changes will follow almost automatically from urbanisation [Apter (1965); Lerner 
(1958) and McClelland (1961)]. 
The Third World’s experiences of urbanisation show that the urban social 
institutions do not emerge by themselves. They have to be developed and nurtured. 
The development experience of Pakistan points towards the social costs of 
institutional lag. 
In Pakistan, urbanisation has eroded kinship ties to some degree and 
introduced communities of interest, but these socio-cultural changes remain 
fragmentary and unrealised. Pakistan’s social organisation and cultural norms are 
being ruralised as much as they are being urbanised. The mass migration of rural 
populations to cities and the entrenchment of power structures in clan, Baradari and 
family has ‘arrested’ the process of social transformation in Pakistan. A few 
examples illustrate this point. 
Most economic transactions and social interactions proceed in the medium of 
personalised dealings. ‘Who knows whom’ is the rule and even if in a situation one 
cannot mobilise some personal ties, one immediately proceeds to forge such relations 
by appealing to primordial bonds of ethnicity, language, religion, sect or region. This 
is the pervasive phenomenon of personalising the impersonal. Most sustained 
dealings are lodged in personal ties and exchanges. 
The political parties, professional and occupational organisation, even the 
ranks and cadres of the civil services and the military develop sub-stratum of 
brotherhood ties. They turn into social networks reminiscent of Baradaris and tribes. 
The prestigious DMG (CSP) group has long behaved as a tribe, mutually supporting 
and even arranging marriages among sons and daughters. The army, the traders 
associations and, even, trade unions operate as extended families and clans. 
Even the charity and good deeds largely follow one’s obligations to relatives, 
neighbours, clan, sect or religious communities. The friendships are consolidated by 
reciprocated sentiments of brotherhood. All in all, normatively, organisationally, and 
symbolically, Pakistan’s transactional institutions are based on norms and values of 
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personalised dealings and primary relations. Whereas the urban economic, social and 
administrative functions require impersonal, rules-based and interest-led interactions. 
The development of social institutions incorporating urban norms is lagging. The so-
called feudalism in Pakistan is not limited to villages and tribes, but its institution 
and values permeate bureaucracies, political parties, universities and corporations. 
Most urban organisations are hollow institutions, imbibing modern forms but 
functioning on the traditional norms. The underside of these organisations is 
structured like clans and patriarchal families. 
The social institutions and cultural ethos, required for equitable and efficient 
functioning of urban societies, emerge out of the on-going social processes as well as 
from social movements and social legislations. The Western experience bears out 
this proposition. The social transformation of Western societies in the days of their 
early industrialisation was often the result of public acts and initiatives. For example, 
the British enacted means-tested pensions in 1880, insurance for sick and 
unemployed workers in 1911, family allowances in 1945 and the National Health 
Service in 1946. Similarly, the child welfare societies, the suffragette movement, the 
anti-slavery league are examples of social movements agitating for the reform of 
family and community institutions. Yet the state created political space for such 
movements to grow. The sum total of public and communal measures was the rise of 
nuclear families, tolerance and individual rights which in turn shaped the modern 
economic organisation. The organisational structure of urban economy evolves out 
of the norms and values nurtured in institutions such as the family, the school and the 
community. The reforming of these social institutions is an imperative of urban 
development. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Development is a multi-track process: economic growth, political development, 
social transformation and cultural change. All tracks are interlinked, none advances 
very far without the others. This is a long held assumption, validated by development 
theories as well as historical experiences. The World Bank’s agenda of institutional 
reforms is the current expression of this assumption. It also forms the premise of this 
paper. 
Urbanisation is an illustrative example of the process of development. It 
encapsulates all elements of modern development. It is, therefore, an appropriate 
ground to observe the unfolding of the development process. I have used the 
urbanisation of Pakistan as a probe to uncover reasons for its inconsistent and 
unbalanced development. 
Pakistan is an urbanised society spatially and materially. Both the implosion 
of population in rural areas and the explosion of population in cities have combined 
to create vast regions of human settlement where urban densities and spatial forms 
prevail. Urbanisation comes with its own institutional, organisational and 
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technological imperatives, e.g. changing bases of the land system, precipitation of 
needs for collective goods, infrastructure, public health and welfare and effective 
local government, reorganisation of local economies and the necessity of forging 
social institutions and cultural patterns appropriate for the interdependent living. This 
analysis suggests that Pakistan is deficient on all these imperatives. 
A pervasive condition of the institutional lag has developed between the social, 
cultural and organisational institutions, on the one hand and the spatial, technological 
and material conditions on the other. Particularly stuck are the processes of social 
transformation and cultural change. The emergence of impersonal dealings, rules-based 
organisations, achievement and merit as the bases of social status, tolerance, thrift, trust 
and fulfillment through work as values undergriding organisational culture have been 
stalled. The urban (social) institutions and cultural patterns continue to be largely 
structured around the traditionalist norms and values forged in the agrarian milieu. 
Most urban institutions have highly patterned, parallel but unacknowledged structures, 
networks of favour exchanges and brotherhoods of mutual benefits, reminiscent of 
Baradaris and kinships. The lagging institutions and cultural practices drag down 
economic productivity, efficiency and equity. At political and sociological planes, the 
institutional lag is observable in what has been called the economy of affection, 
nepotism, corruption, personalisation of the impersonal, political instability and social 
strife. Pakistan’s development will remain episodal and unfulfilling, without the 
transformation of its social institutions and cultural change. 
Briefly, Pakistan needs a deliberate and planned effort of social reform. It is a 
task that requires participation of individuals, communities and the state. Social 
movements for literacy, family planning, women and children’s rights, fair justice, 
minorities’ protection, community self-help, religious tolerance and labour unions, 
etc. have to be promoted. Such movements foster urban ethos and modern 
institutions as they did in Britain, the USA and other Western countries in the early 
20th century.  They are the part of a country’s society. 
Correspondingly, the state-sponsored social legislation is required to lay the 
basis of a modern society through the welfare rights of the poor and the aged, land 
reforms, modernisation of family law, freedom of information act and social 
insurance for the unemployed, universal education and health insurance, 
administrative reforms and reorganisation of local and provincial authorities, citizens 
participation in public decision, etc.  Most of these measures require legislative, 
political and administrative actions. They are affordable even by a poor country like 
Pakistan. They will bring about institutional changes which, in turn, will modernise 
Pakistan. Myrdal’s Modernisation Ideals are relevant even today. Their fulfillment 
promise prosperity and harmony in Pakistan. 
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Comments 
 
In this paper the author has highlighted some of the social, cultural and 
economic imbalances in the society by uncovering inconsistencies and lags in the 
process of development. To explain this he has taken the urbanisation process in 
Pakistan as an illustrative example of urban unfolding that is emerging from 
increasing population densities in vast rural areas that according to the author are 
symptomatically urban in many ways, thus adding to the high-density 
agglomerations that are already identified as urban. While the author’s main concern 
that Pakistan’s urbanised settlements are deficient in institutional, organisational and 
technological imperatives, including the need of deliberate and planned effort of 
social reform, is both interesting and an important policy concern, his argument in 
many respects mainly keeps the western model in consideration and does not address 
to the inherent positive values in some of the traditions and how these could be 
utilised to achieve the desired goal. 
For any comparison to be made of urban and rural population within the 
context of development, parallels cannot be so easily drawn between the developed 
countries and developing countries by mixing up the definition with realities of 
developmental history and infrastructure as in Canada and U.S.A., and definitions 
without much of realities as in India or Philippines. For example population 
concentrations in Canada or U.S.A. have different age structures in the rural or urban 
areas with higher proportions of less dependent, higher aged, more educated 
population with increasing numbers with ‘ready-made’ young immigrants from other 
countries helping to keep the proportions of dependent population at lower levels. 
Such is certainly not the case for both rural and urban concentrations in a country 
like Pakistan, where population densities have much larger contributions of very 
young people due to sustained levels of high fertility, and the developments at 
individual and collective levels, both economically and socially have been very slow. 
The author’s contention that the high density of population is a “transformative 
force” is too simplistic and incomplete statement in explaining the developmental 
scenario in rural-urban developmental axis. Similarly the statement by the author that 
the settlement system emerging is “Ruralopolis” indicates that the population as a 
whole ignores the degenerational aspect of the institutions and social systems even in 
the rural concentrations due to rapid population growth, and frustrations creeping-in 
through information that becomes available by inter-personal communication and 
exposure to foreign and local media in particular the electronic media. The authors 
observation “that the purely rural population is a minority in Pakistan…” seems to 
have been made having in mind the perception of his childhood images of rural 
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verses the urban life. What has happened over time is that the present rural and 
present urban  through out the world including Pakistan, have been influenced by 
changes that have affected the life of the people both positively and negatively. For 
example the access to Television and Radio, and better transport communication had 
little positive impact to keep the air and water cleaner, which used to be the case in 
most of the rural and even in the urban areas. I totally agree with the author that the 
current urban crisis in the Third World is more a symptom of institutional lag than 
the resource limitation.  However, the same applies to the population as a whole, not 
merely to its urban segments.  
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